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Groundwater Conservation Policy in Agriculture 
Introduction 
  Agriculture uses a clear majority of the surface and groundwater resources 
utilized by the human community in most regions of the world.  Allocation conflicts 
between the agricultural sector and the sectors representing municipalities, industry and 
even the environment are increasingly prevalent in arid and semi-arid regions.  Policy 
debates over water quality, water quantity, water conservation, endangered species, and 
property rights increasingly dominate the domestic and international political agenda 
(Anderson; Donahue and Johnston; Gleick; Postel). 
  Emerging public tensions were evident in central Arizona throughout the 1960’s 
and 1970’s over the role of groundwater in meeting the future water demands of a 
growing urban population and a prosperous agricultural sector.  A series of three major 
events led the state’s political leaders to the negotiating table to fashion legislation 
promoting the conservation and management of groundwater (Burton; Connall).  First, a 
series of legal decisions (Jarvis I, II, and III) eventually established the right and 
quantified the amount of water cities could extract from off-site municipally-owned 
wells, generally in rural areas, and transport the water to municipal consumers.  
Secondly, the court determined in the Farmers Investment Company case that mines 
could no longer withdrawal groundwater from neighboring lands and transport the water 
away from those lands for use in the mining operations because of the damage done to 
neighboring wells. This court ruling threatened the ability of mines and cities to meet 
their long-term water needs without buying large acreages of farmland.  Finally, within 
this uncertain legal environment, the federal government threatened to discontinue 
funding for the Central Arizona Project (CAP), a 336-mile aqueduct importing Colorado   3
River water into central Arizona, unless the state passed a comprehensive groundwater 
management code. 
  The Groundwater Study Commission, created by the state legislature in 1977, was 
charged with studying the possibility of a comprehensive groundwater law reform.  
Specifically, the Commission was given the responsibility to (1) clarify conflicting 
groundwater rights claims, including transportation rights, (2) design a management plan 
for critical overdraft areas, (3) institute a program to encourage efficient water use,  (4) 
manage water for future population growth, and (5) protect the environment.  After two 
years of intense negotiation between mines, cities, and agriculture, the Groundwater 
Management Act (GMA) was signed into law on June 11, 1980.  The Arizona 
Department of Water Resources (ADWR) was established in the GMA to implement and 
enforce the new water code.  The GMA has won acclaim and awards over the years for 
its approach to groundwater management (Woodard).  
  The GMA initially established three Active Management Areas (AMAs) in three 
important agricultural/urban areas where a long history of groundwater overdraft (nearly 
2 million acre-feet per year) threatened the long-term viability of farming and urban 
expansion.  The legislative goal in the Phoenix and Tucson AMAs was safe yield or zero 
overdraft in 2025.  In the Pinal AMA, a relatively more agriculturally dependent region, 
the goal was to preserve farming as long as possible without jeopardizing municipal 
water supplies.  Water conservation practices, in all economic sectors, was encouraged 
via increasingly restrictive policies on water use.  
  In the case of agriculture, the GMA regulated water conservation by (1) not 
allowing the development of new agricultural land, (2) requiring the ADWR Director’s   4
approval to drill new, non-replacement wells in the AMA, and (3) a series of 
management plans that gradually reduced the quantity of water available to the grower in 
a given year.  The annual water allotments (A) represented the amount of water a farmer 
could use from wells and/or surface supplies where: 
(1)  A = W * L 
(2)  W = (I/E), 
and 
(3)  E = CWR/w. 
From (1)-(3) above, W is the irrigation water duty, and L is the highest number of acres 
farmed during the period of January 1, 1975 to January 1, 1980.  I is the annual irrigation 
requirement per acre for the crops grown on the farm during this same period.  E is the 
assigned irrigation efficiency (e.g. 75%), where CWR is the crop water requirement and 
w is the actual volume of water applied.  ADWR had policy discretion over two variables 
used to establish the annual water allotment, E and I.  An irrigation efficiency of 65% 
was established in this first period, with the expectation that E would be set at 75% and 
85% in the second (1990-2000) and third (2000-2010) management plans, respectively.  
By increasing E, ADWR expected to induce growers to adopt water-conserving irrigation 
practices as their water allotment declined.  I was set by ADWR at 5.05 acre-feet per acre 
per year in the first management period, 1980-1990. 
  Actual water use was measured with flow meters on all wells and irrigation 
district-managed turnouts in all AMAs.  If a farmer used less water than A in equation 1, 
the grower could bank the difference in a flexibility account (i.e. flex credits).  In water 
short years due to increased cropped acreage and/or high ambient temperatures, the   5
grower could borrow from the flex account in order to maintain the economic 
productivity of the farm. 
  No formal assessment of ADWR’s agricultural water conservation program has 
been conducted during its nearly 25-year implementation period.  Most reflections on the 
agricultural provisions of the GMA are descriptive and fail to quantify the program’s 
degree of success in promoting water conservation in agriculture (Jacobs and Holway).  
One economic evaluation effort, using a mathematical programming model to simulate 
expected water use in the agricultural sector, concluded that neither improved water 
conservation practices or technologies, or agricultural land retirement would assure safe 
yield in 2025 as required by the GMA (Cory et al.).  More general reviews of 
groundwater conservation programs and technologies do not formally evaluate existing 
public programs (Parker and Tsur; Koundouri). 
  This paper outlines the conceptual framework used to evaluate the impact of 
GMA regulations on water use in central Arizona’s agricultural sector.  This impact 
assessment then tests the hypothesis that the GMA had minimal impact on agricultural 
water conservation over 20 years.  Our qualitative and quantitative results indicate that 
water use in the agricultural sector has remained constant over the study period, and crop 
prices and rainfall explain most variability in water use, not the GMA’s management 
plans.  The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for Arizona and 
other water management entities interested in agricultural water conservation programs. 
Methods 
  Program evaluation systematically analyzes the efficiency and effectiveness of 
program processes and/or outcomes relative to program goals (Rossi, Lipsey and   6
Freeman).  Evaluations are conducted for a myriad of reasons, among them (1) outcome 
assessment, (2) implementation improvement, (3) oversight, and (4) knowledge 
generation.  Generally and ideally, evaluations generate future social improvement, either 
directly or indirectly.  The “big tent” of evaluation tools contains many evaluation 
approaches, methods, and purposes (Mark, Henry and Julnes).  Stufflebeam analyzed and 
ranked 22 widely-used evaluation models.  He concluded that eight approaches (e.g. 
decision/accountability, client-centered/responsive, case study, and outcomes 
monitoring/value added) ranked “very good” and should receive preference in 21
st 
century evaluations.  
  Published evaluations by economists of agricultural water conservation programs 
in the US are limited in number and scope.  Most of the professional literature focuses 
exclusively on farm-level technology adoption utilizing standard benefit-cost analysis 
methods (Caswell and Zilberman; Coupal and Wilson; Anderson, Wilson and 
Thompson).  Adoption decisions of water conserving technology depend, according to 
this literature, on appropriate soil conditions, increments in yield, water savings, and the 
availability of investment resources.  Only in rare circumstances do evaluators forecast 
potential water savings in the sector associated with these technologies (Ayer, Wilson 
and Snider).  Evaluations of ongoing, public-supported water conservation programs, on 
a program-wide basis, are strikingly absent in the public domain.   
  Denzin’s triangulation approach to program evaluation characterizes our mixed-
method impact analysis (Mohr).  Triangulation inherently contains checks and balances 
for the analysis—giving the evaluation greater strength and rigor than single method 
evaluations (Patton).  Our impact analysis design triangulates with analyst, data, and   7
method (qualitative and quantitative).  We interviewed ten irrigation district managers, 
eleven current or former staff members of ADWR, and nine water experts, analysts, and 
growers, thirty interviews in all. We also gathered water purchased, water pumped, price, 
weather, and acreage data for eleven irrigation districts in the three AMAs for the period 
1984–2002. These eleven districts represent 69 percent of the irrigated acreage in these 
AMAs. This data, along with an ADWR water use data set, allowed us to conduct 
statistical analysis of water demand across time in eleven irrigation districts. With 
structural, institutional, and operational knowledge of these districts, we explain the 
majority of the variation in water demand across districts.  Also, we test the impact of the 
Second and Third Management Plans of the GMA on agricultural water demand.  
Qualitative Analysis   
Responses to open-ended questions form the foundation of the qualitative 
analysis.  Three identical questions were directed at individuals:  
1. In your opinion, has the 1980 Groundwater Management Act been an effective 
policy for agricultural water conservation?  Why or why not? 
2.  If it had been your responsibility, how would you have designed a GWMA in 
the year 1980 to promote agricultural water conservation? 
3.  In your judgment, how could the current water conservation program in 
agriculture be improved? 
These responses yielded shared insights and explanations for the degree of impact of the 
GMA on agricultural water use.   8
Quantitative Analysis  
We pooled water purchased and pumped, water price, commodity price, and weather 
variables for the eleven irrigation districts for the period 1984-2002.  This panel data 
series has the benefit over cross-section or time-series data in that it controls for 
individual heterogeneity (Baltagi).  Panel data suggest that individual irrigation districts 
are heterogeneous, avoiding the risk of obtaining biased results.  Panel data produces 
more information, more variability, less collinearity, more efficiency, and more degrees 
of freedom than the other types of data series.  Finally, panel data allows the researcher to 
study the dynamics of adjustment.  
For this impact assessment, we estimate the following model: 
(4)   ln wit = ai + b1 ln (wpit) + b2 ln precipit + b3 ln tempit + b4 ln alfpt  
+ b5 ln barpt + b6 ln cotpt + b7 ln whept + 㬠 8 GMA2 + 㬠 9 GMA3 + eit   
where w is the water purchased and pumped (acre feet) in the i
th irrigation district (i = 
1,…,11) in year t where t is 1,…,19 (1984-2002).  The price paid for irrigation water by 
the grower is wp.  The expected sign is negative because water purchased decreases as 
the price of water increases for the farms in the irrigation district.  Precip represents the 
annual rainfall in i
th district in year t.  Precipitation is expected to have a negative sign 
because rain and irrigation water are substitutes.  We hypothesize that temp, the average 
temperature during the growing season March to September, will have a positive sign.  
Alfalfa (alfp) and cotton (cotp) prices are expected to have positive signs. A higher 
alfalfa or cotton price will yield more acres planted to alfalfa or cotton causing more 
water to be purchased.  The sign for wheat (whep) and barley (barp) prices is expected to 
be negative because they are relatively lower water demand crops.  GMA2 and GMA3 are   9
dummy variables for the implementation periods of the second and third management 
plans.  We hypothesize that the coefficients on the dummy variable for the second and 
third management period will be negative, implying a policy impact on reducing water 
consumption in the agricultural sector. 
Results and Discussion 
Water experts in the state share the belief that individual farms adopted water 
conservation technologies in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. The passage of the 
GMA created a perception of an impending, and binding water constraint. The fear that 
this legislation could hurt agricultural operations in the future induced some growers to 
line their ditches, laser level their fields, and improve water management practices. 
Simultaneously, the impending arrival of CAP water in central Arizona encouraged some 
farmers to level fields, create level basins in their fields, and construct high volume 
turnouts. Experts agree that individual farms adopted water conservation improvements 
during the study period but that most of these decisions had very little to do with the 
conservation requirements in the first, second and third management plans. The only 
legislated policy that “conserved” water for the future, according to the interviewees, was 
the requirement that irrigated acreage could not be expanded in the AMAs beyond the 
acreage in the 1975–1979 period. 
  So why did the GMA have little direct impact on water conservation decisions in 
agriculture?  First, the Act and the implemented management plans did not establish an 
effective water constraint for most farms.  Rather, the legislation established a 
“constraint” that was not binding on the decision making of most growers.  The GMA 
established 1975–1979 as the period used to determine water duty acres and authorized   10 
the highest number of acres irrigated during this period to receive a water allocation. 
This period represents the peak of irrigated acreage in central Arizona over the last forty 
years.  To compound matters, ADWR calculated a generous water duty based on 
average crop needs during 1975–1979 for the first management plan.  As a result, most 
growers, but not all, felt no binding water constraint on their irrigation water use.   
  A second factor in creating an ineffective water constraint was the design and 
implementation of the flex account program beginning in 1986–1987.  Growers now had 
the right to “bank” portions of their water allotments that were not used in a given year. 
Farmers could accumulate these credits over the years and withdraw them when they 
increased their cropped acreage (within GMA limits), experienced a hot summer, grew 
more water-intensive crops, or farmed more intensively.  They also could sell a limited 
number of credits to other farmers within their district or groundwater sub-basin after the 
GMA amendments of the 1990s. 
  Accumulated flex credit accounts have grown to tens of thousands of acre feet of 
water for individual farms for several reasons.  First, during the 1980s the agricultural 
economy went through a period of low commodity prices and high interest rates.  Low 
profitability and credit constraints reduced acreage planted and water use, but increased 
flex credits.  Secondly, until 1996, federal commodity programs required growers to set 
aside a portion of their land to receive commodity program payments.  These set-aside 
acres earned flex credits.  At present, the average flex credit account in the three AMAs 
represents six years of irrigation water for the “average” grower.  In summary, generous 
water allotments combined with generous flex credit provisions created a decision 
environment in agriculture where water availability was not a binding constraint for most   11 
growers.   
  Our quantitative, econometric results are consistent with these qualitative 
findings.  Using a log-log econometric model for water demand (equation 4), corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we find that water prices, crop prices, and 
weather explain nearly all the variation in water purchased and pumped over the study 
period (Table 1).  The price elasticity of demand for agricultural irrigation water is -0.111 
and is significant at the five percent level.  Weather variables (precipitation and 
temperature) have the hypothesized signs and are statistically significant.  All commodity 
prices have the hypothesized signs but are not statistically significant.  Conservation 
provisions in the second and third management plans had no noticeable impact on the 
quantity of water utilized by growers, even obtaining a positive sign in the model rather 
than the negative hypothesized sign. 
Growers respond to market signals when evaluating the profitable adoption of 
water-conserving irrigation technologies and practices.  Declining crop prices and low, 
stable water prices over the last half of the study period served as disincentives to the  
adoption of costly technologies or to a significant change in water management practices. 
Aggregate water use in the agricultural sector has declined slightly due to urbanization in 
some of the irrigation districts in the Phoenix AMA.  However, the trend in per acre 
water use in the agricultural sector has remained relatively constant over the life of the 
GMA.  A final note: it is important to realize that groundwater has been conserved in the  
three AMAs over the later half of the study period because low-cost CAP water has been 
available to the agricultural sector.  As a result of favorably priced CAP water, overall 
water use and irrigation rates per acre in agriculture have remained remarkably constant   12 
over the study period. 
Conclusion 
  The GMA has raised the visibility of water issues in the state over the last twenty-
five years.  Required recordkeeping, reports, planning, and negotiation sensitized the 
agricultural sector to its important role in the management of water resources in the state. 
The GMA currently serves as a valuable framework for policy analysis and discussions. 
However, the agricultural water conservation provisions of the second and third 
management plans of the GMA by themselves did not create significant incentives for on-
farm water conservation practices and technologies.  While many growers have adopted 
water conservation practices and technologies over the past twenty-five years, factors 
other than the management plans have been largely responsible.  The GMA changed the 
political environment, but the management plan provisions did little to change the 
economic incentives or water management decisions of most agricultural business 
managers.  Many water experts interviewed for this study concluded that some 
combination of education (e.g. irrigation management assistance), a best management 
practice program, and economic incentives (e.g., tax credits, cost shares) could have been 
lower cost and more effective tools for achieving desired water conservation goals in 
Arizona’s agricultural sector.   13 
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Table 1: Fixed Effects Water Demand Model for Central 
Arizona Irrigation Districts 
  Corrected Fixed Effects 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Intercept 
Ln (Water Price) 
Ln (Annual Precipitation) 
Ln (Average Temperature) 
Ln (Alfalfa Price) 
Ln (Barley Price) 
Ln (Cotton Price) 
Ln (Wheat Price) 
 
Second Management Plan 




























New Magma IDD 
Queen Creek IDD 
Roosevelt IDD 
Roosevelt WC 
Salt River Project 





























*Significant at 5% level  **Significant at 1% level 
 